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The Basic Structure as Object: Institutions and Humanitarian Concern1 
Leif Wenar 
 
One third of the human species is infested with worms.2 The World Health 
Organization estimates that worms account for 40 percent of the global disease burden 
from tropical diseases excluding malaria.3 Worms cause a lot of misery. 
In this article I will focus on one particular type of infestation, which is 
hookworm. Approximately 740 million people suffer from hookworm infection in areas 
of rural poverty: more than one human in ten, a total greater than 23 times the population 
of Canada or twice the population of the United States. The greatest numbers of cases 
occur in China, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa—that is, mostly in the places in 
the world where poverty is most severe.4  
Hookworm larvae pierce the skin, enter the bloodstream, work their way into the 
heart and then into the lungs, where they climb the bronchial tree into the throat and are 
swallowed.5 The major clinical manifestations of hookworm infestation are the result of 
chronic blood loss after the mature worms attach themselves in the intestines and feed on 
the host’s blood. The blood loss leads to a loss of iron and protein, which can cause 
weakness, difficulty in breathing, swelling, impotence, and even heart failure. The worms 
also reduce the body’s auto-immune response, making infection by other diseases such as 
malaria and HIV-AIDS more likely. The heaviest infestations occur in children of school 
age, where the worms can cause physical and cognitive growth retardation. The anemia 
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caused by worms is a particular threat to adolescent girls and pregnant women, since their 
iron stores are low. Severe anemia is associated with high maternal mortality, reduced 
lactation, and low birth weight. Iron-deficiency anemia accounts for a greater loss of 
disability-adjusted life years [DALYs] in East Africa than does HIV-AIDS, and to almost 
as great a loss of DALYs as malaria.6 
Hookworm infestation is one aspect of global poverty, the magnitude and severity 
of which is well known.7 I will assume here that individuals who live in rich countries 
have a moral duty to do something to help to alleviate this poverty, and discuss what it is 
that these individuals might best do.8 Within political philosophy it is still Peter Singer’s 
1972 article on famine that sets the agenda for discussions of how individuals should 
respond to severe poverty abroad.9 I agree with Singer that it is important to trace the 
response to the gigantic problems of severe poverty back to the actions of individuals. 
What I wish to discuss is Singer’s thesis, still widely held in academic philosophy, that 
the model for individual action against poverty should be to send funds to an aid NGO 
known to be effective in preventing the deaths of poor people. In particular I wish to 
concentrate on Singer’s efforts to draw our attention to particular forms of individual 
action through assertions like this one: “Expert observers and supervisors, sent out by 
famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in famine-prone areas, can direct our 
aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own 
block.”10 The conclusion of this paper will not be that individuals should abstain from 
sending money to NGOs like Oxfam, but that if they do send money they may wish to do 
this for reasons different than Singer suggests. 
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The complexities of humanitarian aid 
It is helpful to focus on hookworm, because hookworm eradication presents a best 
case scenario for poverty relief. We can start by contrasting efforts to eradicate 
hookworm infestation from other types of aid efforts. I do not mean to suggest that these 
other types of aid efforts are necessarily ineffective, but rather that they are more 
complicated than hookworm eradication and so that their anticipated effects on poverty 
will be that much more uncertain. 
Humanitarian aid, which aims at short- or medium-term benefits for those that 
receive it, exhibits many of these complexities.11 Humanitarian aid includes immediate 
provision of food and shelter, dehydration relief, and medical attention. The most 
pressing concern about humanitarian aid is that the efforts to provide it unavoidably 
become entangled in the political dynamics of the region. This is especially clear in 
contexts of armed conflict. In order to gain access to the needy, relief organizations may 
have to turn food aid over to a local army or militia. The presence of free food or medical 
care may encourage combatants to continue fighting, or it may encourage them to drive 
unwanted minorities out of the region into refugee camps. The camps where 
humanitarian aid is given may themselves also become loci of disease transmission, or 
havens for refugee-soldiers to regroup and recruit in preparation for launching further 
attacks.12 
In non-combat situations, the availability of humanitarian assistance may 
encourage poor-country governments to shirk responsibility for the fates of their most 
impoverished citizens — that is, it may encourage governments to divert funds away 
from domestic relief capacity (and toward, for example, the military), or to disown the 
 4 
poorest completely. Moreover, the presence of foreign humanitarian assistance may 
thwart efforts (by, for example, other aid agencies) to promote long-term self-reliance 
among the poor. In both combat and non-combat contexts, aid agencies must often hand 
over a significant percentage of their project budgets to authoritarian governments, to 
corrupt officials, and to criminals. The agencies must pay these levies in order to meet 
their tax obligations, in order to maintain their headquarters in the national capital, and in 
order to “get things done” in the field. These payments often enrich and legitimate groups 
which have used and continue to use their power in ways that exacerbate the crisis.13 
Indeed most of the humanitarian crises that affect poor people can themselves be 
traced directly to failure in the institutions of governance. Famines of the kind that Singer 
discusses are caused more by a breakdown in political and economic institutions than by 
an absence of food within the country. As Amartya Sen has written, for good 
governments “famines are, in fact, so easy to prevent that it is amazing that they are 
allowed to occur at all.”14 It is because famine and hunger happen in contexts of 
institutional failure that the insertion of resources from outside often does not have its 
intended effects. For example, Ethiopia received significant food aid each year during the 
decade after the great famine of the mid-1980’s, normally equivalent to about 10% of its 
total food production.15 During this period, and despite the fact that there was enough 
food in-country to meet the nutritional needs of all Ethiopians, almost half of Ethiopian 
households remained food-insecure. A significant amount of food was distributed 
through food relief projects, yet relatively little of this food reached those in need. Very 
well-off districts were just as likely to receive the imported food as very poor districts, 
and on average less than 23% food-insecure households received any food. Moreover, 
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much of the food that was distributed to food-secure households ended up being resold on 
local markets, depressing food prices and diminishing incentives for domestic production, 
thus increasing food insecurity and stimulating another campaign for food aid the next 
year.16  
The risks of humanitarian intervention illustrate what might be called the iron law 
of political economy. Resources tend to flow toward those that have more power; or, to 
put it the other way around, the less powerful people are, the harder it is to get resources 
to them. The richer, stronger, healthier, better armed, better fed, better educated and 
better located people are, the more likely they are to capture benefits from any stream of 
resources. 
 
Development and institutions 
A hookworm alleviation project can be free of many of the risks of humanitarian 
assistance. Providing the drugs that expel hookworms displaces no domestic productive 
capacity. The distribution of these drugs is unlikely to encourage armed combat or ethnic 
cleansing or to further the spread of disease. Nor are the pills likely to counteract efforts 
to promote long-term self-reliance, or to disrupt local markets in essential goods.  
Hookworm alleviation is a development project, and is also likely to be among the 
least complicated of such projects. While humanitarian efforts aim at short-term benefits, 
development projects aim at long-term improvements in self-sufficiency that will enable 
the poor to alleviate their own poverty. Development projects include initiatives to 
improve education, transportation, communications, good governance, contraception 
awareness, women’s political empowerment, and so on. Most development projects 
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encounter difficulties in design and implementation that hookworm alleviation programs 
do not share. 
Most development projects face the general dilemma that their plans must be 
extremely sensitive to domestic circumstances to ensure recipient participation and so 
success; yet their success also frequently turns on significant changes in the political, 
productive, or reproductive practices of those who are meant to participate. Asia and 
Africa are speckled with decaying infrastructure projects, funded by development aid, 
whose operation did not fit with the skills and customs of the surrounding populations. 
When a project’s success will depend on a change in gender or sexual relations—such as 
with female literacy or AIDS-prevention projects—these kinds of difficulties are 
intensified.17  
Hookworm alleviation again avoids many of these complexities. We know that 
the drugs used are powerful and safe remedies, and for them to be effective as remedies 
requires no more participation from those who need them than being willing to take some 
pills. Nor is hookworm relief likely to cut against the grain of established customs: 
chronic listlessness is part of no one’s cultural heritage. As a bonus, hookworm 
alleviation is cheap. A recent hookworm alleviation program in the Zanzibar school 
system that treated 30,000 students obtained the needed drugs at a cost of only eight cents 
per student per year. The final evaluation of this program estimated that, considering all 
costs, the program prevented 1208 cases of moderate-to-severe anemia for $3.57 per 
case, and 276 cases of severe anemia for $16.30 per case.18 
Hookworm alleviation is a best case scenario for development. We have money 
here, the cheap drugs can be administered over there. Even if there may be complexities 
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with other sorts of aid projects, here it seems that we have a straightforward case where 
Singer-type reasoning suggests that rich individuals should augment the funds of NGOs 
to help address the problem. Before drawing this conclusion, however, we may pause to 
take a closer look at some issues that will affect the success of a hookworm eradication 
project, especially those concerning the institutional context in which the project is 
carried out. 
One issue involves time. If a child is given anthelminthic drugs, her hookworms 
will clear. However, if that is all that happens, she will very likely be reinfected with 
hookworms within a few months. Hookworm eradication, as any successful poverty-
relief program, requires a long-term commitment. With major public health problems like 
hookworm, malaria and AIDS, 10 or 15 years is a reasonable time-scale for making 
significant progress. This kind of extended commitment requires that reliable institutions 
be in place to ensure a project’s continuing success. It is cheap and easy to administer 
hookworm drugs to students for 10 years in the Zanzibar school system because the 
school administrators, teachers, and nurses already have the students gathering daily right 
in front of them. In more remote rural settings, the difficulties of long-term treatment 
increase significantly. This recalls the point made above that because of institutional 
factors it is usually harder to help people the poorer they are. 
Successful development projects require not only commitment over time, but 
monitoring and flexibility as well. The experiences gained while implementing a project 
will almost always be needed to improve the project’s effectiveness, and projects must be 
able to adapt to circumstances that change while they are in progress. For example, a 
recent study proposes measures that can be taken to improve the performance of the 
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personnel engaged in implementing a deworming program, and another study considers 
whether an outreach program for non-attending children in Zanzibar might be needed.19 
The requirements that project managers learn and adapt once again point to the 
advantageousness of a good institutional context for aid, since these kinds of feedback 
mechanisms are built into well-structured organizations.  
All of these factors point toward the importance of an effective institutional 
context for development. In principle the best institutions for implementing development 
projects are those of the domestic government where the poverty occurs. The reasons for 
this can be seen again in the Zanzibar school project. The Zanzibar school project was not 
in fact implemented by an NGO, but by the local ministries of education and of health. 
The advantages of implementation through properly functioning domestic institutions are 
several. First, governments can solve implementation problems through a mixture of 
legitimate coercion and the distribution of significant benefits to citizens. The reason that 
the Zanzibari children showed up together in the place where they could all be dewormed 
is that there is both a law requiring them to attend school and the lure of a free education. 
Second, governments employ their own citizens almost exclusively, which makes it more 
likely that those implementing a development project will be able to understand, 
communicate with, and gain the trust of the recipient population. Zanzibari parents gave 
permission for their children to be given special pills because they and their children had 
well-established regular contacts with the teachers and nurses at the school. Third, 
government ministries are expected to coordinate their efforts with each other on an 
ongoing basis, so officials in ministries like education and health will likely have regular 
contact and working relations.  
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Finally, and most significantly, good institutions are important for successful 
development because of the accountability these institutions provide. In a well-
functioning political system, the standard mechanisms of accountability are in place. 
Governmental auditing agencies, academic study, media scrutiny, interest-group pressure 
and free elections give ministries clear incentives to implement effective (long-term, 
monitored, and flexible) development programs. Moreover because a domestic 
government is spending public money, there are standing expectations (and sometimes 
legal provisions) within a well-functioning system that officials should be accountable to 
those who receive development assistance, and to the voters.  
Accountability is of central importance in development because the iron law of 
political economy operates on development aid just as much as on humanitarian aid. 
Without the checking mechanisms of good institutions in place, it is very difficult to get 
resources for development to flow, and to continue to flow, toward those who have the 
least power. For example it is not helpful to install a water conduit in a remote village if 
after the aid agency leaves the conduit is taken over by a local gang as a source of 
revenue, thus forcing the poorest villagers to travel even farther to get fresh water. The 
benefits of paying doctors to staff rural health clinics are reduced if, as in Bangladesh, the 
absentee rate for the doctors is 74%.20 Even a gigantic poverty-relief program like 
Mexico’s PRONASOL, which spent over one percent of the country’s GDP per year for 
five years, will be ineffective in combating poverty if the funds are primarily used by 
state officials to support the ruling party through electioneering and clientage.21 
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Challenges for NGOs 
Hookworm alleviation is a best case scenario for development, and in the best 
case projects like it will be carried through by an effective domestic government.22 
However, in most poor countries institutions are either quite weak, or are strong and self-
serving. Indeed most poor people in most poor countries remain poor at least in part 
because their political institutions are inefficient, venal, despotic, or absent altogether. 
Non-governmental organizations join the effort to reduce poverty specifically because 
domestic governmental organizations are not functioning. Aid NGOs are meant to 
perform the tasks of domestic ministries like health and education where the domestic 
ministries cannot or do not work effectively toward the public good. Aid NGOs are “free 
floating” institutions, whose directors, managers, and front-line workers attempt to 
perform the tasks at which domestic governments fail.  
Because aid NGOs are free floating institutions, each is its own self-contained and 
self-defined unit. Some have a single-issue focus, like reproductive health or the 
environment. Others have an explicitly religious mission that combines poverty relief 
with proselytizing. Others are large organizations whose front-line workers are mostly 
young, short-term employees without experience of the area in which they will work. 
Almost all aid agencies come into a country from the outside, with a mission, funding, 
and managerial staff that are literally foreign. All of these factors often make it difficult 
for NGOs to integrating their programs with government ministries, with recipient 
populations, and with the other NGOs working in-country. The lack of coordination 
mechanisms makes miscommunication and crossed purposes between NGOs and locals a 
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constant hazard. Sometimes just the sheer number of NGOs working in a country will 
undermine their efforts at poverty relief.23 
All of these potential obstacles have long been known to aid professionals, and 
the best NGOs (such as Oxfam and Care) make concerted efforts to work around them. 
Agencies like these have permanent staff in-country who make regular contacts with 
government ministries. The best agencies try to employ experienced local workers in 
both managerial and front-line jobs. They have put in place formal and informal 
mechanisms to coordinate their efforts with at least some of the other major agencies 
which work in the same regions. These agencies have been dedicated and resourceful, 
working individually and working together, in attempting to get their operations to 
emulate what a set of well-functioning domestic governmental institutions would do. 
However because of their non-governmental character, NGOs also face several 
difficulties that counteract their efforts to relieve poverty which it is harder to know how 
to mitigate. Some of these difficulties we have already seen above in the context of 
humanitarian aid. NGOs often have to support the local poor-country government 
financially: either to get permission to carry out a development project, or in taxes. These 
payments sometime support the rule of authoritarian leaders, or free up money for 
increased military spending, or feed and encourage corruption in the bureaucracy. NGOs 
must sometimes pay corrupt officials or warlords in order to maintain their headquarters, 
and must sometimes pay off or even employ criminals in order to carry out their projects 
in the field. Those who exercise illegitimate power in a country are often glad to welcome 
aid agencies in, as having agencies in the country will often make their power greater. 
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And NGOs of course have no coercive power of their own, which limits their ability to 
bargain with governments and criminals.  
These difficulties emerge from the non-governmental character of NGOs and the 
environments in which they operate. They have caused serious problems in many anti-
poverty efforts, but they are not the aspects of NGO operations on which I would like to 
focus. Rather, I will focus on a major defect within the institutional structure of NGOs 
themselves: a defect whose pervasiveness makes assessing the overall effectiveness of 
NGOs in fighting poverty quite hard. This is a deficit of accountability. As we have seen, 
in a well-functioning political system the standard mechanisms of accountability pressure 
those who control development resources to ensure that those resources continue to flow 
toward those with the least power. The central question for NGOs is how they are held 
accountable for their efforts. Who, that is, will reward NGOs if their anti-poverty projects 
are effective, and who will sanction NGOs if their projects are ineffective or 
counterproductive? I will focus on this question, because the answer to it bears directly 
on what individuals in rich countries who are concerned about poverty have reason to do. 
 
NGOs and accountability 
NGOs are almost never accountable in a meaningful way to those in the 
communities in which the projects are carried out. There has recently been in 
development circles a new emphasis on participation in projects by the “target” 
population.24 Yet even so there is little real sense in which a poor community can 
sanction an aid agency for having implemented a project that fails. Moreover, the 
mechanisms of accountability within a well-functioning political system apply to NGOs 
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imperfectly, or not at all. NGOs are not subject to the discipline of democratic elections, 
nor to the oversight of governmental auditing offices.25 Since NGOs are bringing money 
into a country instead of spending public money, the domestic media (even when free) 
often do not give them serious scrutiny; and the failure of a complex development project 
in a poor country is not something to which the international media attends. There are a 
substantial number of studies done by academics of NGO-implemented projects, yet there 
are only weak mechanisms for translating these studies into opportunities for 
accountability.  
One would expect that aid NGOs would be mostly accountable to those who fund 
them: either to rich donor governments (which are usually the main source of funds) or to 
private individuals who make charitable donations. While these are large topics, it is 
reasonable to conclude that these donors are not generally successful in directing funds to 
NGOs proportionately to their proven track record in reducing poverty. Funding 
ministries in rich countries (like the United States Agency for International Development 
[USAID]) usually have as a primary mission the promotion of interests in the funding 
country, not the reduction of poverty abroad.26 This does not necessarily mean that these 
ministries will fail to attend to poverty relief, since (as USAID emphasizes) foreign 
poverty relief might be one means toward promoting rich-country goals such as domestic 
security. However, as a matter of fact these ministries are not well structured to be 
agencies of accountability, because they are mostly responsive to rich-country political 
constituencies which have little interest in NGO effectiveness.27 This is apparent when 
one examines, for example, USAID budgets. USAID budgets are near-horizon plans set 
partially by the State Department, which wishes to have money sent to a particular 
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foreign government for strategic reasons; and partially by Congress, which mostly aims 
to further domestic economic interests (e.g., by buying surplus grain grown by American 
farmers and sending it overseas in American ships).28 Holding aid NGOs accountable for 
the effectiveness of their poverty-reduction projects is therefore a much lower priority for 
USAID than is moving money so as to meet the current year’s political imperatives.29 As 
for private individuals who make charitable contributions, they are poorly situated to be 
agents of accountability since they have, as we will see, few bases on which to judge 
whether a particular NGO’s projects are helping to reduce poverty or not. 
These deficits in accountability affect many aspects of NGO operations. For our 
purposes, the most serious effect is on the evaluation of development projects. The 
evaluation of a development project is the primary mechanism by which the success of 
the project is judged. Evaluation is therefore the primary mechanism through which it 
could be known which NGOs are doing the best job in alleviating poverty, and how good 
a job they are doing.  
Development evaluation is its own professional specialization, with university-
based training programs, departments within aid agencies and government ministries, a 
specialized literature, international conferences, and so on. Evaluation is professionalized 
because development projects are often very difficult to assess. An evaluator must judge 
what effects a given intervention (like an AIDS education program or a microlending 
initiative) has had within an extraordinary complex causal environment, and can only 
make these judgments by contrasting the current situation with the counterfactual 
situation in which the intervention was not made. Moreover an evaluator must consider 
not only the effectiveness of the project in meeting its goals, but also its efficiency in cost 
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terms. An evaluator must in addition try to predict the long-term effects of the project, 
since these effects are usually the most vital for the project’s ultimate success. Because of 
all of these complexities, there is a great deal of latitude in judging how successful any 
given project has been and will be.30 
It is likely that the latitude available to project evaluators, combined with the lack 
of NGO accountability, has resulted in a serious positive bias in project evaluation. It is 
likely that evaluators tend, that is, to attribute more success to projects than is 
warranted.31 We can first see why this phenomenon should have occurred, before going 
on to the evidence that it does occur and the consequences of its occurrence. The reasons 
for the positive bias are simply that all parties (besides the poor) have an interest in 
projects being evaluated positively, and that there are few mechanisms of accountability 
in place to check this tendency. Aid agencies have an interest in positive evaluations, 
since these positive reviews will improve their reputations within a competitive 
fundraising environment and a sometimes-hostile political climate. The governments both 
in funding countries and in recipient countries have interests in positive evaluations, since 
these validate their approval of the projects. And, most importantly, the evaluators 
themselves have strong reasons to submit positive evaluations. This is obvious for the 
“self-evaluations” that are done for most smaller development projects, where the group 
who has implemented the project also judges the success of the project. It is also true of 
evaluators who are hired as outside consultants for larger projects, since these consultants 
know that their future employment will often turn on a favorable review of the project of 
the agency that employs them. Even in-house evaluators, like those who work in the 
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institutionally-insulated evaluation department of the World Bank, know that the way to 
get ahead is not to file too many reports that their agency’s projects have failed.32  
The positive bias in project evaluation has led to what is known as the “micro-
macro gap.” The “micro” evaluations that development agencies and aid-recipient 
governments commission for their own projects have uniformly found the great majority 
of these projects to be quite successful in meeting their poverty-reducing goals. Yet 
several macroeconomic studies have found no or at best weak correlation between 
increased aid and important poverty indicators.33 Given that the “micro” projects aim at 
the kinds of outcomes that the “macro” studies measure, at least one of these conflicting 
positions concerning project effectiveness must be mistaken.34 
A major, independent study of NGO effectiveness states that: 
 
A repeated and consistent conclusion drawn across countries and in relation to all 
clusters of studies is that the data are exceptionally poor. There is a paucity of 
data and information from which to draw firm conclusions about the impact of 
projects, about efficiency and effectiveness, about sustainability, the gender and 
environmental impact of projects and their contribution to strengthening 
democratic forces, … and institutional capacity.35 
 
A large Finnish meta-survey concludes, “Multi-country studies raise serious 
doubts as to whether many NGOs know what they are doing, in the sense of their overall 
impact on people’s lives.”36  
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The epistemological problem for individuals 
Let us bring the discussion back to the question of what individuals in rich 
countries who are aware of their duty to help alleviate severe poverty might best do in 
practical terms. The problem for most such individuals is not financial, but 
epistemological. What individuals in rich countries need to know is what they can do so 
as to support projects that will most effectively alleviate poverty, and how much good 
they can expect to accomplish. Unfortunately, for most rich individuals the knowledge 
they need is veiled from them in two layers. The most readily available sources of 
information about the activities of aid NGOs—websites, newspaper advertisements, 
direct mailings, interviews in the media—are not generally reliable sources for learning 
about NGO project effectiveness. Most of the materials that NGOs target at the public are 
prepared by marketing professionals, and are subject no effective independent oversight. 
Further, the information these materials tend to highlight—individual success stories, 
figures for total funds spent, pie-charts showing percentages of budgets devoted to 
“projects” versus “administration”—are not the kinds of information needed to make 
judgments about project effectiveness.37 
What individuals would need to know in order to evaluate an NGO would be how 
effective all of its projects had been in the past, and the details of its future project plans. 
Yet plans for future projects are rarely made publicly available, and no NGO makes all of 
its evaluations public. Moreover, even if this information were public, it would be 
insufficient. For, as we have seen, because of positive bias in evaluation even the NGOs 
themselves do not have a clear picture of the impacts of their projects on poverty. 
Individuals in rich countries cannot get the information that NGOs have about their 
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projects, and even if they could get this information they would still not know how 
effective their contributions would be in reducing poverty. 
Singer has written, “We can all save lives of people, both children and adults, 
who would otherwise die, and we can do so at a very small cost to us: the cost of a new 
CD, a shirt or a night out at a restaurant or concert, can mean the difference between life 
and death to more than one person somewhere in the world – and overseas aid agencies 
like Oxfam overcome the problem of acting at a distance.”38 The moral seriousness in 
this quote is commendable, yet as we have seen the confidence it shows is questionable. 
Indeed it would be an interesting exercise to see how much could be determined about 
the net effects of any donation since 1972 made to an aid agency by someone who had 
been influenced by writings that share Singer’s empirical assumptions.39   
 
Skepticism and individual action 
This is perhaps the time for a word about aid skepticism. Aid skepticism—the 
position that we know that aid cannot or at least has not worked—has been a recurrent 
theme in the literature about aid for more than three decades. Some people come across 
aid skepticism in journalistic books, such as Michael Maren’s The Road to Hell: The 
Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity 40 or David Rieff’s A Bed for 
the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis41. These popular accounts have a larger number of 
less sensational counterparts in the development literature, where there has been a steady 
drumbeat of discouraging works.42 The skepticism had its effect on aid agency budgets in 
the 1990s, as donors pulled back on contributions that had, it appeared to some, produced 
meager results.  
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Aid skepticism is a real presence in the literature on aid, but it is not the position 
of this paper. I have not said that we know that aid has not worked, or recommended 
reductions in funding to aid organizations. Rather, I have emphasized how little is known 
about the effects of aid efforts on poverty, and the importance of acting with this limited 
knowledge in mind. In the absence of effective and accountable institutions like those in 
rich countries, it is much harder to know what the effects will be of adding more 
resources into complex and often unstable political situations. The risks of unintended 
and even counterproductive consequences are much higher, and it will be more difficult 
to discern whether additional resources will produce an overall improvement. Yet the 
vast suffering caused by severe poverty is of too great moral importance to allow the real 
difficulties with aid provision to be either understated or overhyped. To conclude that 
nothing can be done would be at least as counterproductive as insisting that there is no 
difference between relieving poverty halfway around the world and saving a life on one’s 
own block. Individuals who are seriously concerned about poverty will be interested in 
how to relieve this poverty within this world, where the poverty actually exists. 
Singer’s model for individual action is based on the empirical thesis that we know 
that aid works extremely well. What would a model be like that takes the uncertainties of 
aid into account? I believe that there are at least three strategies for individuals in rich 
countries who want to act on the moral imperative to help alleviate global poverty. The 
first is to become deeply involved with a particular aid project. It would be outrageous to 
suggest that no projects ever produce net benefits, even when the many complexities are 
taken into account. An individual with an excellent understanding of the plan of a 
particular project, of the organization undertaking the project, and of the larger political, 
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economic, and cultural context of the region, may well be able reach a reasonable 
judgment about the project’s likely impacts. With sustained engagement, a very well-
informed individual may well be able to further the cause of poverty alleviation. The 
level of commitment that can be expected here is significant. Professional evaluators with 
detailed knowledge of the region often spend several weeks on-site to assess a project’s 
efficiency and effectiveness; so non-specialists who have little regional experience can 
anticipate that much more time than this will be needed.43 First-hand and sustained 
engagement with the project will likely be necessary, especially in order to monitor how 
the project will respond to attempts to redirect its flow of resources. 
A second strategy is for individuals to become involved directly in the reform of 
the mechanisms by which multi-national institutions and aid NGOs address the problems 
of poverty. An individual could attempt, for example, to learn about the ways in which 
the policies of the international financial institutions impact upon the world’s poorest, 
and work to improve these policies. The commitment required here is also significant, as 
an individual will need to gain a great deal of specialized knowledge (e.g., about global 
finance), and to act energetically in concert with others, in order to contribute to the 
reform of these entrenched institutional structures. 
A third path is to work as an agent of accountability within rich-country politics. 
The governments of rich countries affect the fates of the poorest in poor countries in 
many different ways. The governments of rich countries can through their foreign 
policies directly affect the viability of the governments of poor countries. Rich-country 
governments also have by far the greatest influence over the rules of the global market, 
and so have a tremendous influence on poor-country prosperity. And rich-country 
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governments determine how most of the funds that will be devoted to development will 
be used—through their bilateral grants to poor countries, through their control of the 
international financial institutions like the World Bank, and through the development 
programs they fund directly. The third path aims to raise the political price for those 
officials in rich-country governments who do not act to ensure that the conditions of the 
world’s poorest improve. The advantage of this third, political path is that individuals do 
not need professional expertise in development in order to pursue it. In political action, 
one can simply demand results. One can simply demand, for instance, that the 
Millennium Development Goals be met, without allowing any space for renegotiation or 
excuse.  
The difficulty with political action, of course, is that demanding is not the same as 
succeeding. Many individuals make many different kinds of demands on rich-country 
governments, and only the most determined coalitions of individuals make any impact at 
all. Here is where aid NGOs can play a significant role as coordinating agents of 
accountability. Aid NGOs can use their expertise gained from working in poor countries 
to inform voters and activists in rich countries which issues are ones on which pressure 
can usefully be brought to bear. For example, the recent “trade fairness” campaigns of 
NGOs like Oxfam and Christian Aid appear to have influenced some of the major media 
in rich countries to take up the cause of tariff and subsidy reform in the World Trade 
Organization, and in this way to have increased pressure on rich governments to adopt 
more pro-poor policies. If aid NGOs could be effective in playing this coordinating role 
for dedicated individuals in the rich world, their potential for helping to improve the 
conditions of the poor could be substantially greater than it is now. Indeed this seems to 
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be the view of Oxfam itself, which has through its history moved from a mission centered 
humanitarian relief, to a mission emphasizing long-term development, to the current 
mission which incorporates political action as a major component. Oxfam is also 
especially well-designed as an agent of political accountability, since unlike most major 
aid agencies it has been careful not to take money from rich governments and so 
compromise its political independence.44 
None of these strategies is easy or sure to show quick results. Gone from them is 
the sense from Singer’s articles that anyone in a rich country can save a life simply by 
staying home on a Saturday night. This seems to me inevitable on any realistic view of 
the institutions, both governmental and non-governmental, in rich countries and poor 
countries, that stand between rich individuals and the poor people who might benefit 
from assistance. Individuals who take Singer’s route of giving money to aid NGOs are 
not handing resources to the poor as they would hand resources to someone down the 
street. They are, rather, inserting resources into a complex set of institutions, the basic 
structure of which will determine who will benefit from those resources.45 Attending to 
the institutions that affect the long-term prospects of the poor, and working to improve 
how these institutions operate, will be a high priority for those whose real goal is to help 
alleviate severe poverty. For humanitarians, the basic structure of institutions must be a 
primary object of concern. 
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